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Abstract. From 11.01.09 to 16.01.09, the Seminar 09031 in Symmetric
Cryptography  was held in Schloss Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center for Infor-
matics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts
of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of sem-
inar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended ab-
stracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Symmetric cryptography, symmetric primitives and cryp-
toschemes, hash functions, block ciphers, stream ciphers
09031 Executive Summary  Symmetric Cryptography
Research in Symmetric Cryptography is quickly evolving. The seminar was the
second of its kind, the ﬁrst one took place in 2007. We observe a steadily increas-
ing interest in Symmetric Cryptography, as well as a growing practical demand
for symmetric algorithms and protocols.
The seminar was very successful in discussing recent results and sharing
new ideas. Furthermore, it inspired the participants to consider how Symmetric
Cryptography has evolved in the past, and how they would like it to evolve in
the future.
Keywords: Symmetric cryptography, symmetric primitives and cryptoschemes,
hash functions, block ciphers, stream ciphers
Joint work of: Handschuh, Helena; Lucks, Stefan; Preneel, Bart; Rogaway,
Phillip
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1959
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Nostradamus Attack on Tree Hash Functions
Elena Andreeva (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE)
Originally, the Nostradamus attack, also known as chosen target forced preﬁx
preimage attack, was introduced by Kelsey and Kohno in [KeKo06] and applied
on strengthened Merkle-Damgard (MD) iterative hash functions. In this work
we adapt the attack for the particular case of tree based hash functions. The new
Nostradamus attack on tree hash functions diﬀers mainly in the precomputation
step from the original attack on the MD construction but has approximately the
same complexity (as MD) in its oine, online and memory requirements.
Moreover, we develop a simple long message second preimage attack on tree
hash functions and adapt a TMD methods to decrease the computation.
Keywords: Nostradamus attack, tree hash functions
Joint work of: Andreeva, Elena; Dunkelman, Orr; Kelsey, John
See also: [KeKo06] J. Kelsey and T. Kohno, "Herding Hash Functions and the
Nostradamus Attack", In EUROCRYPT 2006
Physically Unclonable Pseudorandom Functions
Frederik Armknecht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE)
With the proliferation of physical attacks the implicit assumptions made in
traditional security models no longer reﬂect the real world. To address this
issue, a number of new security models, e.g. Algorithmic Tamper-Proof Secu-
rity, have been proposed. In this work, we take another step and identify the
cryptographic properties of a particular family of physical functions, termed
as Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), that exploit physical phenomena at
deep-submicron and nano-scale level. PUFs provide low-cost tamper-evident and
tamper-resiliant implementations. Motivated by this fact, we specifcally describe
a general method for constructing Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) from a class
of PUFs. We provide a formal model for certain types of PUFs that build the
basis for PRFs, which we call PUF-PRFs. Furthermore, we show experimentally
that some real world PUF instantiations (e.g.,SRAM PUFs) satisfy the model.
This strongly indicates that PUF-PRFs can indeed be physically realized. Fi-
nally, we describe two symmetric ciphers that use PUF-PRFs as building blocks.
Keywords: Pseudorandom Functions, Physically Unclonable Functions
Joint work of: Armknecht, Frederik; Roel, Maes; Ahmad, Reza-Sadeghi; Berk,
Sunar; Pim, Tuyls
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Cube Testers and Key Recovery Attacks On
Reduced-Round MD6 and Trivium
Jean-Philippe Aumasson (FH Nordwestschweiz - Brugg, CH)
This talk presents cube testers, a new class of attacks that combines cube attacks
and eﬃcient property-testing algorithms. The power of cube testers is illustrated
with attacks on reduced-round Trivium and MD6.
Keywords: Cube attacks, property testing, MD6, Trivium
Joint work of: Aumasson, Jean-Philippe; Dinur, Itai; Meier, Willi; Shamir, Adi
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1944
Bug attacks
Eli Biham (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We present a new kind of cryptanalytic attack which utilizes bugs in the hard-
ware implementation of computer instructions. The best known example of such
a bug is the Intel division bug, which resulted in slightly inaccurate results for
extremely rare inputs. Whereas in most applications such bugs can be viewed
as a minor nuisance, we show that in the case of RSA (even when protected by
OAEP), Pohlig-Hellman, elliptic curve cryptography, and several other schemes,
such bugs can be a security disaster: Decrypting ciphertexts on any computer
which multiplies even one pair of numbers incorrectly can lead to full leakage of
the secret key, sometimes with a single well-chosen ciphertext. The implications
to public key cryptosystems and secret key cryptosystems are discussed.
Keywords: Bug attack, Fault attack, Side-channel attack, RSA, ECC, Pohlig-
Hellman
Joint work of: Biham, Eli; Carmeli, Yaniv; Shamir, Adi
See also: proceedings of CRYPTO 2008
Design of AES-based hash-functions: LUX and Cheetah
Alex Biryukov (University of Luxembourg, LU)
In this talk we describe design process and ideas behind the two new hash func-
tions LUX and Cheetah.
LUX is a stream based hash function. Cheetah is a block-cipher based one,
using MD-HAIFA mode.
We will also discuss issues related to the SHA-3 competition: speed vs. secu-
rity, parallel vs. sequential attacks, possible selection scenario for the 1st round.
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Keywords: Hash functions, design and cryptanalysis
Joint work of: Biryukov, Alex; Khovratovich, Dmitry ; Nikolic, Ivica
MutantXL: Solving Multivariate Polynomial Equations for
Cryptanalysis
Johannes A. Buchmann (TU Darmstadt, DE)
MutantXL is an algorithm for solving systems of polynomial equations that
was proposed at SCC 2008 and improved in PQC 2008. This article gives an
overview over the MutantXL algorithm. It also presents experimental results
comparing the behavior of the MutantXL algorithm to the F4 algorithm on
HFE and randomly generated multivariate systems. In both cases MutantXL is
faster and uses less memory than the Magma's implementation of F4.
Keywords: Multivariate systems, MutantXL
Joint work of: Buchmann, Johannes A.; Ding, Jintai; Mohamed, Mohamed
Saied Emam; Mohamed, Wael Said Abd Elmageed
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1945
Suﬃcient conditions for sound tree hashing modes
Joan Daemen (STMicroelectronics - Zaventem, BE)
We consider the general case of tree hashing modes that make use of an un-
derlying compression function. We consider such a tree hashing mode sound
if diﬀerentiating it from a random oracle, assuming the underlying compression
function is a random oracle can be proven to be hard. We demonstrate two prop-
erties that such a tree hashing mode must have for such a proof to exist. For each
of the two properties we show that several solutions exist to realize them. For
some given solutions we demonstrate that a simple proof of indiﬀerentiability
exists and obtain an upper bound on the diﬀerentiability probability of q2/2n
with q the number of queries to the underlying compression function and n its
output length. Finally we give two examples of hashing modes for which this
proof applies: KeccakTree and Preﬁx-free Merkle-Damgard.
Keywords: Tree Hashing, Indiﬀerentiability
Joint work of: Guido, Bertoni; Joan, Daemen; Michaël, Peeters; Gilles, Van
Assche
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1946
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New Results on Optimal Fixed Length Physical Random
Number Post-Processing Functions
Markus Dichtl (Siemens - München, DE)
When functions with n input bits and m output bits are used for post-processing
the output of a physical random number generator, which is assumed to pro-
duce statistically independent bits with a ﬁxed bias , the probabilities of the 2m
outputs can be represented as polynomials in . For a good post-processing func-
tion all low powers of  should have coeﬃcients of zero. K. Suzuki and T. Iwata
showed in the paper "Bounds on Fixed Input/Output Length Post-Processing
Functions for Biased Physical Random Number Generators" presented at SAC
2008 for most cases with 1 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ 16 how many low powers of  can be
maximally eliminated, but there were 13 cases remaining open. This paper solves
these 13 cases.
Keywords: Postprocessing, physical random numbers
Some positive and negative results on Cube-style attacks /
The pseudo-euclidian algorithm
Thomas Dullien (zynamics GmbH - Bochum, DE)
This talk discusses a few small results related to cube-style algebraic attacks. It
is shown that in a white-box scenario with
f = ml + r
and (degl = 1)), the complexity of extracting l is much less than 2degm oracle
queries  this means the attacker does not need to sum over the entire cube, just
over a much smaller subset. An algorithm is provided to construct such smaller
subsets.
It is further shown that generalizing cube-style attacks to decompositions of
the form
f = pl + r
(where p is a polynomial) is unlikely to yield many beneﬁts over the monomial
scenario.
The second talk presents some results that show that the ring of boolean
functions, even though it is not euclidian, allows for an algorithm that performs
an equivalent task: Given a set of n generators for an ideal, the algorithm can
calculate the single generator for the entire ideal (the ring of boolean functions is
a principal ideal domain) in n polynomial multiplications and n+ 1 polynomial
additions.
A number of interesting results follow from this:
6 Helena Handschuh, Stefan Lucks, Bart Preneel and Phillip Rogaway
 Calculating the product of a set of boolean functions which have one solution
in common is equivalent to solving them
 Estimating the number of monomials in the product gives information about
the hamming weight of the solution
 Restrictions of boolean functions to particular subsets can be calculated
easily
Keywords: Cube attacks, algebraic attacks, poset, lattice, boolean functions,
euclidian algorithm, principal ideal domain
SHAvite-3 - A New and Secure Hash Function Proposal
Orr Dunkelman (ENS - Paris, FR)
In this work we present SHAvite-3, a secure and eﬃcient hash function based
on the HAIFA construction and the AES building blocks. SHAvite-3 uses a well
understood set of primitives such as a Feistel block cipher which iterates a round
function based on the AES round. SHAvite-3's compression functions are secure
against cryptanalysis, while the selected mode of iteration oﬀers maximal secu-
rity against black box attacks on the hash function. SHAvite-3 is both fast and
resource-eﬃcient, making it suitable for a wide range of environments, ranging
from 8-bit platforms to 64-bit platforms (and beyond).
Keywords: SHAvite-3, SHA-3, hash function
Joint work of: Dunkelman, Orr; Biham, Eli
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1947
Aggregation of Message Authentication Codes
Marc Fischlin (TU Darmstadt, DE)
Aggregation schemes combine several MACs into a single value in order to re-
duce the communication overhead. A prominent example is the MAC scheme
by Katz and Lindell (CT-RSA 2008) which supports aggregation in arbitrary
order (as opposed to many schemes allowing only sequential aggregation). Here
we revisit their unforgeability notion and discuss that the deﬁnitions do not pre-
vent "mixing" attacks in which the adversary combines several aggregates. In
particular, we show concrete attacks on these schemes.
We thus provide the stronger security notion of aggregation unforgeabil-
ity, capturing a much broader class of combination attacks. We then present
aggregation-unforgeable constructions somewhat lying between non-ordered and
sequential solutions.
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That is, we propose the notion of history-free sequential aggregation, a reﬁne-
ment which basically says that the aggregation algorithm must not depend on
the preceding messages in the sequence but only on the shorter input aggregate
and the local message. We ﬁnally show how to build such history-free protocols.
Keywords: Aggregation, Message Authentication Code, Unforgeability
Classiﬁcation of the SHA-3 Candidates
Christian Forler (Sirrix AG Bochum, DE)
In this note we give an overview on the current state of the SHA-3 candidates.
First, we classify all publicly known candidates and, second, we outline and
summarize the performance data as given in the candidates documentation for
64-bit and 32-bit implementations. We deﬁne performance classes and classify
the hash algorithms. Note, that this article will be updated as soon as new
candidates arrive or new cryptanalytic results get published. Comments to the
authors of this article are welcome.
Keywords: Hash function, SHA-3, classiﬁcation
Joint work of: Forler, Christian; Fleischmann, Ewan; Gorski, Michael
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1948
Full Paper:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/511
The Lane hash function
Sebastiaan Indesteege (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE)
We propose the cryptographic hash function Lane as a candidate for the SHA-3
competition organised by NIST. Lane is an iterated hash function supporting
multiple digest sizes. Components of the AES block cipher are reused as build-
ing blocks. Lane aims to be secure, easy to understand, elegant and ﬂexible in
implementation. We give the speciﬁcation of Lane, and the rationale behind the
important design choices. For a more extended speciﬁcation, security analysis
and a discussion of the implementation aspects, we refer to the Lane submission
document.
Keywords: Lane, SHA-3 candidate, hash function
Joint work of: Indesteege, Sebastiaan; Andreeva, Elena; De Cannièrie, Chris-
tophe; Dunkelman, Orr; Käsper, Emilia; Nikova, Svetla; Preneel, Bart; Tis-
chhauser, Elmar
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Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1952
Full Paper:
http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/lane/
Practical Collisions for EnRUPT
Sebastiaan Indesteege (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE)
The EnRUPT hash functions were proposed by O'Neil, Nohl and Henzen as
candidates for the SHA-3 competition, organised by NIST. The proposal contains
seven hash functions, each having a diﬀerent digest length. We present a practical
collision attack on all of these seven EnRUPT variants.
The time complexity of our attack varies from 236 to 240 round computations,
depending on the EnRUPT variant, and the memory requirements are negligible.
We demonstrate that our attack is practical by giving an actual collision example
for EnRUPT-256.
Keywords: EnRUPT, SHA-3 candidate, hash function, collision attack
Joint work of: Indesteege, Sebastiaan; Preneel, Bart
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1950
See also: Proceedings of Fast Software Encryption 2009, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, Springer (to appear).
Practical Preimages for Maraca
Sebastiaan Indesteege (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE)
We show a practical preimage attack on the cryptographic hash function Maraca,
which was submitted as a candidate to the NIST SHA-3 competition. Our attack
has been veriﬁed experimentally.
Keywords: Maraca, hash function, preimage attack
Joint work of: Indesteege, Sebastiaan; Preneel, Bart
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1951
On the Impact of Key Check Value on CBC MACs and
Others
Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, JP)
ANSI X9.24, Annex C, "Retail Financial Services, Symmetric Key Management"
speciﬁes the use of a key check value (KCV), which is a part of the ciphertext
of a binary zero value.
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In this talk, we discuss the impact of using KCV on the security of CBC MAC
variants, EMAC and CMAC. We present attacks, provable security results, and
possible ﬁxes.
Keywords: CMAC, EMAC, key check value, proof of security.
Key recovery Attack on Interactable Keyed Functions
Shahram Khazaei (EPFL - Lausanne, CH)
In cryptology we commonly face the problem of ﬁnding an unknown key K from
the output of an interactable keyed function F(V, K). The input parameter V
is a publicly controllable value which makes F interactable in the sense that an
oracle provides the adversary with the output value of the function for any V of
her choice and for any ﬁxed random key. The goal of the adversary is to recover K
as eﬃciently as possible. This talk gives an overview of the recent works done in
this direction by Vielhaber [eprint'07], Fischer-Khazaei-Meier [Africacrypt'08],
Dinur-Shamir [eprint'08] and Khazaei-Meier [Indocrypt'08]. In particular apply
the method to Klomov-Shamir's T-function based self-synchronizing stream ci-
pher.
Keywords: Key recovery attack, interactable function, self-synchronizing stream
cipher, cube attack.
Joint work of: Khazaei, Shahram; Meier, Willi
Gaussian cryptanalysis of hash functions: collisions,
preimages, distinguishers
Dimitry Khovratovich (University of Luxemburg, LU)
Many attacks on hash functions can be reformulated in ﬁnding a hash execution
with constraints being ﬁxed values of internal variables. Those variables can be
input or output bits, input of active S-boxes or AND operations, etc..
The constraints lead to a system of nonlinear equations, which sometimes can
be solved with a fast algorithm resembling the Gaussian elimination. If a system
has been solved then solutions can be produced with negligible time costs.
The main condition for the algorithm to succeed is relatively slow diﬀusion in
the attacked primitive. Provided this we show how to attack AES as a hash func-
tion and prove that a 30-round MD6 compression function can be distinguished
from the random oracle.
I will also show how it worked in practice in a GUI-tool.
Keywords: Hash functions, cryptanalysis, Gauss, AES
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Message Authentication for Streams with Delayed Keys
Anja Lehmann (TU Darmstadt, DE)
We consider message authentication codes for streams where the key becomes
known only at the end of the stream. This usually happens in key-exchange
protocols like SSL and TLS where the exchange phase concludes by sending
a MAC for the previous transcript and the newly derived key. SSL and TLS
provide tailor-made solutions for this problem (modifying HMAC to insert the
key only at the end, as in SSL, or using upstream hashing as in TLS). Here
we take a formal approach to this problem of delayed-key MACs and provide
solutions which are as secure as schemes where the key would be available right
away but still allow to compute the MACs online even if the key becomes known
only later.
Joint work of: Fischlin, Marc; Lehmann, Anja
Mini-ciphers: a reliable testbed for cryptanalysis?
Jorge Nakahara (EPFL - Lausanne, CH)
This talk addresses the issue of miniaturized cryptographic primitives, with par-
ticular focus on block ciphers. Examples include mini-versions of IDEA and the
AES, which are straightforward to derive because they operate word wise. Mini-
ciphers are often used as testbeds for new attacks, in order to collect data such as
success rate and to corroborate theoretical predictions. An implicit assumption
of this approach is that results on mini-ciphers shall equally apply to the original
cipher. But, is it always the case? In this talk, I will present some experiments
on higher-order square attacks applied to mini-AES versions.
Keywords: Cryptanalysis of block ciphers, mini-ciphers, AES, square attacks
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1961
Internal collision attack on Maraca
Maria Naya-Plasencia (INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt, FR)
We present an internal collision attack against the new hash function Maraca
which has been submitted to the SHA-3 competition.
This attack requires 2237 calls to the round function and its complexity is
lower than the complexity of the generic collision attack when the length of the
message digest is greater than or equal to 512. It is shown that this cryptanalysis
mainly exploits some particular diﬀerential properties of the inner permutation,
which are in some sense in contradiction with the usual security criterion which
guarantees the resistance to diﬀerential attacks.
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Keywords: Hash function, collision attack, diﬀerential cryptanalysis, Boolean
function
Joint work of: Canteaut, Anne; Naya-Plasencia, Maria
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1953
Statistical tests for multidimensional extension of Matsui's
Algorithm 1
Kaisa Nyberg (Helsinki University of Technology, FI)
We show that extending Matsui's Algorithm 1 to using multiple linear approx-
imations leads to a statistical goodness-of-ﬁt problem. We examine common
statistical goodness-of-ﬁt tests, propose a new one based on LLR, estimate their
performance, and experiment on key recovery with key ranking using these tests.
Statistical Tests for Key Recovery Using Multidimensional
Extension of Matsui's Algorithm 1
Kaisa Nyberg (Helsinki University of Technology, FI)
In one dimension, there is essentially just one binomially distributed statistic,
bias or correlation, for testing correctness of a key bit in Matsui's Algorithm
1. In multiple dimensions, diﬀerent statistical approaches for ﬁnding the correct
key candidate are available. The purpose of this work is to investigate the eﬃ-
ciency of such test in theory and practice, and propose a new key class ranking
statistic using distributions based on multidimensional linear approximation and
generalisation of the ranking statistic presented by Selçuk.
Keywords: Block cipher, key recovery attacks, key ranking, linear cryptanalysis,
multidimensional approximation
Joint work of: Hermelin, Miia; Cho, Joo Yeon; Nyberg, Kaisa
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1954
Grøstl - a SHA-3 candidate
Christian Rechberger (TU Graz, AT)
Grøstl is a SHA-3 candidate proposal. Grøstl is an iterated hash function with
a compression function built from two ﬁxed, large, distinct permutations. The
design of Grøstl is transparent and based on principles very diﬀerent from those
used in the SHA-family.
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The two permutations are constructed using the wide trail design strategy,
which makes it possible to give strong statements about the resistance of Grøstl
against large classes of cryptanalytic attacks. Moreover, if these permutations
are assumed to be ideal, there is a proof for the security of the hash function.
Grøstl is a byte-oriented SP-network which borrows components from the
AES. The S-box used is identical to the one used in the block cipher AES and
the diﬀusion layers are constructed in a similar manner to those of the AES. As
a consequence there is a very strong confusion and diﬀusion in Grøstl.
Grøstl is a so-called wide-pipe construction where the size of the internal
state is signiﬁcantly larger than the size of the output. This has the eﬀect that
all known, generic attacks on the hash function are made much more diﬃcult.
Grøstl has good performance on a wide range of platforms and counter-
measures against side-channel attacks are well-understood from similar work on
the AES.
Keywords: SHA-3 proposal, hash function
Joint work of: Gauravaram, Praveen; Knudsen, Lars R.; Matusiewicz, Krystian;
Mendel, Florian; Rechberger, Christian; Schläﬀer, Martin; Thomsen Søren S.
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1955
Full Paper:
http://www.groestl.info
A Provably Secure and Eﬃcient Hash Function Framework
Greg Rose (Qualcomm Inc. - San Diego, US)
This humorous talk presents a hash function called O'Toole. It is only a joke. It
is not real.
Keywords: Hash Function
Parallel generation of l-sequences
Andrea Röck (INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt, FR)
The generation of pseudo-random sequences at a high rate is an important issue
in modern communication schemes. The representation of a sequence can be
scaled by decimation to obtain parallelism and more precisely a sub-sequences
generator.
Sub-sequences generators and therefore decimation have been extensively
used in the past for linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). However, the case
of automata with a non linear feedback is still in suspend. In this work, we have
studied how to transform of a feedback with carry shift register (FCSR) into a
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sub-sequences generator. We examine two solutions for this transformation, one
based on the decimation properties of `-sequences, i.e. FCSR sequences with
maximal period, and the other one based on multiple steps implementation.
We show that the solution based on the decimation properties leads to much
more costly results than in the case of LFSRs. For the multiple steps implemen-
tation, we show how the propagation of carries aﬀects the design.
This work represents a cooperation with Cédric Lauradoux and was presented
at the international conference on SEquences and Their Applications (SETA)
2008.
Keywords: Sequences, synthesis, decimation, parallelism, LFSRs, FCSRs
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1956
Full Paper:
http://www-rocq.inria.fr/secret/Andrea.Roeck/pdfs/articleSETA08.pdf
See also: Parallel Generation of l-Sequences - C. Lauradoux and A. Röck - in
Proceedings of SETA 2008, Lexington, Kentucky, USA, September, 4-18, 2008,
LNCS vol.5203, pp. 299-312
The Rebound Attack - Cryptanalysis of Whirlpool
Martin Schläﬀer (TU Graz, AT)
Whirlpool is a block cipher based hash functions with a strong key schedule.
The wide trail design strategy of this hash function makes the application of
standard diﬀerential and linear attacks seemingly diﬃcult. Hence, virtually no
cryptanalytic results on Whirlpool have been published since its proposal eight
years ago.
In this work, we propose the Rebound Attack, consisting of a match-in-the-
middle technique and a subsequent inside-out approach. We apply the Rebound
attack to hash functions and compression function designed according to the wide
trail design strategy. We present an attack on Whirlpool for 7.5 of 10 rounds,
and apply the attack to 8.5 rounds of the compression function Maelstrom and
5 rounds of the Grøstl compression function.
Keywords: Rebound Attack, Whirlpool, Maelstrom, Grøstl, hash function,
collision attack
Joint work of: Mendel, Florian; Rechberger, Christian; Schläﬀer, Martin;
Thomsen, Søren S.
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Some Remarks on FCSRs and Implications for Stream
Ciphers
Dirk Stegemann (Universität Mannheim, DE)
Feedback with carry shift registers (FCSRs) are extensively discussed in the
context of pseudorandom number generation and as building blocks for stream
ciphers. Similarly to linear feedback shift registers, FCSRs may be represented
in Galois and in Fibonacci architecture. We describe the ﬁrst formal characteri-
zation of periodic Galois states and show an eﬃcient mapping between periodic
Galois states and periodic Fibonacci states. Additionally we provide a method
for explicitly computing the autocorrelation of maximum-period FCSR sequences
and discuss the impact of our ﬁndings on the design of stream ciphers.
Keywords: FCSR, F-FCSR, stream cipher design
Algebraic Attacks against Linear RFID Authentication
Protocols
Dirk Stegemann (Universität Mannheim, DE)
The limited computational resources available on RFID tags imply a need for
specially designed authentication protocols. The light weight authentication pro-
tocol HB+ proposed by Juels and Weis seems currently secure for several RFID
applications, but is too slow for many practical settings.
As a possible alternative, authentication protocols based on choosing ran-
dom elements from L secret linear n-dimensional subspaces of GF (2)n+k (so
called linear (n, k, L)-protocols), have been considered. We show that to a cer-
tain extent, these protocols are vulnerable to algebraic attacks. Particularly, our
approach allows to break Cicho«, Klonowski and Kutyªowski's CKK2-protocol, a
special linear (n, k, 2)-protocol, for practically recommended parameters in less
than a second on a standard PC. Moreover, we show that even unrestricted
(n, k, L)-protocols can be eﬃciently broken if L is too small.
Keywords: RFID Authentication, HB+, CKK, CKK2
Joint work of: Krause, Matthias; Stegemann, Dirk
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1957
Making a MAC from a blockcipher that is only a MAC
John Steinberger (Univ. of British Columbia, CA)
We show how to build a variable-input-length MAC (VIL-MAC) from a block-
cipher, where the only security requirement on the blockcipher is that it be a
MAC, instead of a PRP.
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Keywords: Message authentication codes, Shrimpton-Stam construction, Block-
ciphers
Joint work of: Dodis, Yevgeniy; Steinberger, John
The Road from Panama to Keccak via RadioGatún
Gilles Van Assche (STMicroelectronics - Zaventem, BE)
In this presentation, we explain the design choices of Panama [1] and RadioGatun
[2], which lead to Keccak [3]. After a brief recall of Panama, RadioGatun and the
trail backtracking cost, we focus on three important aspects. First, we explain the
role of the belt in the light of diﬀerential trails. Second, we discuss the relative
advantages of a block mode hash function compared to a stream mode one.
Finally, we point out why Panama and RadioGatun are not sponge functions
and why their design philosophy diﬀers from that of Keccak.
Keywords: Hash function, cryptography
Joint work of: Bertoni, Guido; Daemen, Joan; Peeters, Michael; Van Assche,
Gilles
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1958
See also: [1] J. Daemen and C. S. K. Clapp, FSE 1998; [2] G. Bertoni et al.,
NIST Hash Workshop 2006; [3] G. Bertoni et al., SHA-3 submission, 2008
Smashing SQUASH-0
Serge Vaudenay (EPFL - Lausanne, CH)
At the RFID Security Workshop 2007, Adi Shamir presented a new challenge-
response protocol well suited for RFIDs, although based on the Rabin public-
key cryptosystem. This protocol, which we call SQUASH-0, was using a linear
mixing function which was subsequently withdrawn. Essentially, we mount an
attack against SQUASH-0 with full window which could be used as a "known
random coins attack against Rabin-SAEP. We then extend it for SQUASH-0
with arbitrary window. We apply it with the proposed modulus 21277− 1 to run
a key recovery attack using 1024 chosen challenges. Since the security arguments
equally apply to the ﬁnal version of SQUASH and to SQUASH-0, we challenge
the blame-game argument for the security of SQUASH. Nevertheless, our attacks
are ineﬃcient when using non-linear mixing so the security of SQUASH remains
open.
Keywords: Cryptanalysis, chqllenge-response protocol, Rabin encryption
Joint work of: Ouaﬁ, Khaled; Vaudenay, Serge
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AXR - Crypto Made from Modular Additions, XORs and
Word Rotations
Ralf-Philipp Weinmann (University of Luxemburg, LU)
Many symmetric cryptographic primitives are composed solely of modular ad-
ditions, XORs and word rotations - we call these primitives AXR primitives;
usually with words sizes of either 32 or 64 bits. With the SHA-3 competition,
the number of these primitives has increased again. However, the general problem
of solving equations coming from AXR primitives is not studied in the crypto-
graphic literature. This talk shows some preliminary results on how to solve
these equations.
Keywords: Non-linear equations AXR AddXorRol
DECT security
Ralf-Philipp Weinmann (University of Luxemburg, LU)
We present the ﬁrst public analysis of the DECT security standards and imple-
mentations thereof. We show how the DECT Standard Cipher (DSC) was re-
verse engineered and explain severe problems in the authentication mechanisms
used by DECT. One of allows an attacker to re-reroute outgoing calls made
by handsets, the other is an implementation error that can lead to a practical
key-recovery attack on the UAK for various implementations.
Keywords: Dect dsc dsaa cryptanalysis protocol
Joint work of: Weinmann, Ralf-Philipp; Andreas, Schuler; Erik, Tews; Ma-
tthias, Wenzel
Musings on wide-block block ciphers
Doug Whiting (Hi/fn Inc.- Carlsbad, US)
A presentation of the Threeﬁsh tweakable block cipher used in the Skein hash
function submitted to the NIST SHA-3 competition.
In addition, properties of Threeﬁsh if scaled up to even larger block sizes
were discussed.
Cache Timing Analysis of eStream Finalists
Erik Zenner (Technical University of Denmark, DK)
Cache Timing Attacks have attracted a lot of cryptographic attention due to
their relevance for the AES.
Symmetric Cryptography 17
However, their applicability to other cryptographic primitives is less well
researched. In this talk, we give an overview over our analysis of the stream
ciphers that were selected for phase 3 of the eStream project.
Keywords: Cache timing attacks, stream ciphers
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1943
